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PROMOTING COMPETITION AND 
MAINTAINING MONOPOLY: DUAL FUNCTIONS 
OF CHINESE INDUSTRIAL POLICIES DURING 
ECONOMIC TRANSITION 
JIANG XIAOJUAN 
From the early 1950s to the late 1970s, China possessed a planned and 
highly centralized economy. With this economic structure, the market 
played virtually no role, and competition itself was out of the question, let 
alone a government policy encouraging such competition. 
During the late 1970s, China began restructuring its economic system, 
aligning it with policies inherent in a market economy. During this 
process, the Chinese government formulated a number of policies to 
encourage competition and prevent monopolies.1 However, the policies 
ultimately had a negligible effect. By comparison, Chinese industrial 
policies played a more striking role in promoting competition and quelling 
monopolies. One therefore can say that one major purpose of the 
government in formulating every industrial policy since the onset of 
reform was, paradoxically, either to promote or contain competition. 
The first section of this Article briefly examines how China has 
promoted its industrial policies since adopting its policy of reform and 
opening up of trade to the world outside its borders. The second section 
considers how these policies have promoted or restricted competition. 
Finally, the third section presents the author’s conclusions and opinions. 
I. PROMOTION OF INDUSTRIAL POLICIES FOLLOWING ECONOMIC AND 
TRADE REFORM 
Since the late 1970s, China has promulgated an unusually large number 
of industrial policies—far more than Japan did right after World War II. 
From 1978 to 1997, the central Chinese government published more than 
eighty comprehensive industrial policies pertaining to virtually every 
  Professor, Institute of Finance and Trade, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, 
People’s Republic of China.  
 1. The major Chinese antimonopoly laws include the Provisional Rules on the Development 
and Protection of Socialist Competition (1980), Circular on Breaking Regional Market Barriers In 
Order to Further Liberalize Commodity Circulation (1990), Anti-Unfair Competition Law (1993), and 
Provisional Regulations on Banning Excessive Profiteering (1995). 
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government department and industry.2 These industrial policies 
promulgated in the name of the State Council fall into the following 
categories: industrial policies designed to reform the industrial landscape, 
industrial policies with different international measures, and industrial 
policies that support or restrict industries and enterprises. 
A. Industrial Policies Designed to Reform the Industrial Landscape  
Chinese industrial policies aimed at certain specific problems fall into 
three distinct subcategories: industrial polices for restructuring the 
industrial landscape, industrial policies for upgrading the industrial 
structure, and industrial policies for restructuring industrial organization. 
1. Industrial Policies for Restructuring China’s Industrial Landscape 
Many years of central planning gave rise to a lopsided economic 
structure in the 1970s, during which time heavy industry grew faster than 
the manufacturing industry. As a result there was an overproduction of 
many capital goods as well as an acute shortage of most consumer goods. 
To remedy these economic ailments, the Chinese government enacted a 
number of industrial policies from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s to boost 
the consumer goods industry. These policies effectively eliminated the 
shortage of consumer goods. However, shortages in the supply of energy, 
raw materials, and other basic industrial products that subsequently 
emerged as problems in the mid-1980s prompted the Chinese government 
to shift the emphasis of its industrial policies to the development of basic 
industrial products. 
2. Industrial Policies for Upgrading China’s Industrial Structure 
In the mid-1980s, the Chinese government focused much of its 
attention on upgrading the country’s industrial structure. The government 
believed industries employing advanced technology and producing a high 
measure of added value accounted for such a small portion of the Chinese 
manufacturing industry that they had become a major bottleneck. The 
policies did so by reducing the long-term development of Chinese industry 
as a whole at a time when the automotive, microelectronics, and high-
grade durable consumer goods industries had become the industrial 
 2. This figure does not include the numerous industrial policies set by the ministries and 
commissions under the State Council. 
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backbone of many new industrial countries and regions. Since the mid-
1980s, the Chinese government has formulated a package of industrial 
policies to encourage the development of new technology-intensive 
industries. 
3. Industrial Policies for Restructuring Industrial Organization 
In the early days of reform, the Chinese government adopted a policy 
of encouraging the development of small and medium-sized enterprises in 
order to boost consumer goods production as quickly as possible. 
However, in only a few years, the rapid growth of these enterprises in non-
state sectors was impacting market shares, the supply of raw materials, and 
profits of large state-owned enterprises heavily. It was for this reason that 
the Chinese government reoriented its industrial organization policies in 
the late 1980s to curtail the development of small and medium-sized 
enterprises, particularly those in non-state sectors. 
B. Industrial Policies with Different International Measures 
Classified according to the modes of government intervention, one can 
separate Chinese industrial policies into two categories: (1) those that 
directly intervene in industry development, and (2) those that indirectly 
intervene in industry development. 
1. Direct Intervention Industrial Policies 
Industrial policies that directly intervene in industry development allow 
the government to take direct measures through: (1) compulsory 
production-element allocation quotas; (2) administrative requirements for 
the examination and approval of industrial projects; (3) administrative 
“circulars” and “decisions;” and (4) different ways to both control foreign 
exchange and allocate import and export quotas for different industries. 
2. Indirect Intervention Industrial Policies 
Industrial policies that indirectly intervene in industry development 
enable the government to intervene through certain economic means 
including: (1) the institution of varied interest or tax rates for different 
industries; (2) the establishment of different pricing methods for different 
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industries; (3) economic awards or penalties; and (4) the government 
release of information designed to affect enterprise behavior. 
C. Industrial Policies That Support or Restrict Industries and Enterprises 
One can divide industrial policies into two categories by their functions 
to support or restrict industry development. 
1. Supportive Policies 
Supportive industrial policies authorize the government to provide 
preferential treatment to boost the development of certain industries and 
enterprises. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Chinese 
government accorded the consumer goods manufacturing industry 
preferential treatment in the areas of financial input and taxation. 
2. Restrictive Policies 
Restrictive industrial policies authorize the government to implement 
discriminating or restraining policies to curtail the development of certain 
industries and enterprises. For example, since the mid-1980s, the Chinese 
government has forced primarily private small and medium-sized textile 
mills to close down by providing low priced cotton to large textile mills in 
urban areas. 
Because China’s direct and indirect intervention policies also are either 
supportive or restrictive in nature, one can divide China’s industrial 
policies into four types: supportive policies with direct intervention, 
restrictive policies with direct intervention, supportive policies with 
indirect intervention, and restrictive policies with indirect intervention. 
Table 1 illustrates these four types of industrial policies and the measures 
they contain. 
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Table 1: Categorization of Industrial Policies and Relevant Measures in 
China from the Late 1970s to the Late 1990s 
 Supportive policies 
with direct 
intervention 
Restrictive 
policies with 
direct 
intervention 
Supportive 
policies with 
indirect  
intervention 
Restrictive 
policies with 
indirect 
intervention 
Fiscal measures Government fiscal 
investment and 
subsidy 
Banning 
government fiscal 
input 
Tax 
reductions 
and 
exemptions; 
speeding up 
depreciation 
High tax 
rates; 
additional 
taxes 
Monetary 
measures 
Priority in and 
allowance for loan 
grants; permission 
to seek financing on 
the capital market 
Banning loans, or 
issuing loans with 
strings attached 
Preferential 
interest rates 
and 
conditions for 
loan 
repayment 
High interest 
rates and 
unfavorable 
loan 
repayment 
conditions 
Material supply Supplying materials 
at government-
subsidized prices; 
priority in the 
supply of materials 
in short demand 
Providing no 
supply of materials 
at government-
subsidized prices, 
or grants of 
materials in short 
supply 
Allowing 
above-norm 
products to 
be sold 
according to 
market prices 
Banning 
products to be 
sold according 
to market 
prices 
Foreign trade 
and foreign 
exchange 
policies 
Granting import and 
export quotas; 
supplying foreign 
exchange at 
government-
subsidized prices; 
priority to use 
intergovernmental 
loans; providing a 
government 
guarantee for 
borrowing money 
from foreign 
countries 
No import and 
export quotas, no 
foreign exchange 
supplied at 
subsidized prices, 
no use of 
intergovernmental 
loans, and no 
government 
guarantee for 
borrowing money 
from foreign 
countries 
Reduction of 
import and 
export duties; 
granting tax 
breaks for 
exports 
High import 
and export 
customs 
duties 
Examination, 
approvals, and 
administrative 
ordinances 
Granting permission 
to undertake certain 
projects providing 
incentives 
Banning the 
undertaking of new 
projects and 
punitive measures 
  
Decision-
making power 
Allowing enterprises 
to make their own 
decisions in pricing; 
sales and foreign 
trade 
   
Information 
release 
  Government 
guidance by 
way of 
releasing 
relevant 
information 
Government 
releasing 
information 
designed to 
discourage 
development 
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II. INDUSTRIAL POLICIES: DO THEY PROMOTE OR RESTRICT 
COMPETITION? 
From the perspective of market competition, China’s industrial policies 
have undergone three stages of development: (1) from the late 1970s to the 
mid-1980s, the industrial policies promoted competition; (2) from the mid-
1980s to the mid-1990s, the industrial policies limited competition; and (3) 
since the mid-1990s, industrial policies have promoted and limited 
competition in concert. 
A. Industrial Policies from the Perspective of Market Competition 
1. Central Planning and the Monopolistic Nature of China’s 
Manufacturing Industry 
a. Different Forms of Industrial Organization for Different 
Industries 
During the period of central planning, the different branches of the 
Chinese manufacturing industry each possessed a different industrial 
organizational structure.3 Some branches only consisted of a tiny number 
of large enterprises. For example, the automotive industry consisted 
primarily of No. 1 and No. 2 automobile plants, which accounted for over 
90% of the national automotive output. This monopolistic trend, evidenced 
by the small number of enterprises and their high market shares, continued 
in the iron and steel, nonferrous metallurgical, and heavy-duty machinery 
industries as well. 
Under central planning, there also were industries such as the consumer 
goods manufacturing industry that consisted of large numbers of 
enterprises. For example, during the mid-1970s, China possessed 
approximately 180 or so medium-sized and large state-owned cotton mills, 
and more than 200 electrical household appliance enterprises. Judging 
from the sheer number of enterprises alone, these industries obviously 
were not monopolistic in nature. 
 3. See INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND EFFECTIVE COMPETITION: AN INITIAL STUDY OF 
CHINESE INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (Wang Huijiong & Chen Xiaohong eds., 1991) (discussing the 
basic outlay of Chinese industrial organization). 
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b. Lack of Competition: a Common Feature for Chinese Industries 
In a country under central planning, the number of enterprises does not 
necessarily indicate whether an industry is competitive or monopolistic, 
for under central planning, state-owned enterprises regard each other as 
“brothers” rather than competitors. It is impossible for enterprises to 
become competitors under this system because enterprises unify the 
specifications, output, prices, sales and development of products, and 
worker wages under state plans. Thus, the salient feature of central 
planning is that no matter how many enterprises there are, the market will 
remain monopolistic rather than competitive. 
2. Industrial Policies and the Antimonopoly Effort 
During the economic restructuring in China in the late 1970s, the 
Chinese government became keenly aware of the drawbacks of central 
planning and thus began to encourage enterprises to compete with each 
other to increase output, improve efficiency, develop new products, and 
increase employee salaries. To effectuate this new emphasis of Chinese 
industrial policies on competition, the government employed three new 
policy measures: (1) the encouragement of new enterprises; (2) the 
encouragement of competition among existing enterprises; and (3) the 
relaxation of price controls. 
a. Encouragement of New Enterprises 
During the period of central planning, the government maintained the 
power to determine whether companies could establish new factories. This 
made the entrance of new enterprises an administrative matter rather than 
a corporate decision. In the early stages of reform, the government enacted 
a series of policies to encourage new investment in industries and trades 
that the government hoped to develop as quickly as possible. For example, 
the government gave priority in development to new investors in the 
consumer goods production industry, thereby triggering robust growth and 
intensifying competition in and among non-state enterprises. Following 
this success, the government formulated similar stimulus policies for the 
raw materials, energy, and transportation equipment industries. 
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b. Encouragement of Competition Among Existing Enterprises 
Another important aspect of Chinese industrial policies during the early 
stages of reform involved government encouragement for state-owned 
enterprises to increase output and improve efficiency. The government 
accorded preferential policies to state-owned enterprises that fulfilled their 
specific production quotas. These enterprises then could sell their above-
norm products at market prices rather than at state prices and use the 
profits to increase worker wages and other welfare expenses. In industries 
where high tariffs made the entry of large numbers of non-state enterprises 
impossible, the race between state-owned enterprises for this “above-norm 
market” became a major factor in turning monopolies into competitive 
markets. For example, for firms producing high-quality steel plates, high 
tariffs limited competition to several large state-owned plants, with small 
firms proving to be a non-factor. 
c. Relaxation of Price Controls 
Under central planning, the government set prices for all manufactured 
goods, which made effective competition impossible, regardless of how 
much emphasis the government placed on encouraging competition 
between new and existing enterprises. Long after reform began, the prices 
of most products remained under government control. During this time, 
however, the government allowed the market pricing mechanism to 
function in industries supported by government industrial policies. From 
the late 1970s to the early 1980s, the government allowed old and new 
enterprises in these industries to either set the prices for their above-norm 
products or let them float on the basis of state prices. For example, in the 
textile industry, the government allowed the prices for above-norm 
products to float 15% above and below state prices.4 
The role of these supportive policies was rather pronounced: with the 
entry of non-state investors, and the increase of above-norm products of 
state-owned enterprises, the industries under these policies quickly 
increased their output, reduced their prices, sped up development of new 
products and technology, and transformed into typical competitive 
industries. 
 4. See Jiang Xiaojuan, Low-Efficiency Competition in a Transition Process: A Case Study of the 
Textile Industry, in CHINA’S INDUSTRIES IN TRANSITION: ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE, EFFICIENCY 
GAINS, AND GROWTH DYNAMICS 129-63 (Jiang Xiaojuan ed., 2001). 
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3. Case Study: How the Refrigerator Industry Went from Being 
Monopolistic to Competitive 
During the early stages of reform, the refrigerator manufacturing 
industry was a typical monopolistic industry in which several large state-
owned enterprises occupied a large share of China’s total refrigerator 
output. As Table 2 indicates, in 1982, China produced 101,000 
refrigerators, and the top four manufacturers (the Beijing General 
Refrigerator Plant, the Guangzhou Refrigerator Factory, the Shanghai 
Refrigerator Plant, and the Suzhou Refrigerator Plant) had a combined 
output of 74,400 and a production concentration rate of 74.5%.5 
Table 2: Market Structure of the Refrigerator Industry in China  
in the 1980s6 
 Total Output 
(in millions) 
The Top Four Producers’ 
Combined Average Output 
Degree of Production 
Concentration (%) 
1982 
1985 
1988 
0.101 
1.448 
7.576 
18,600 
143,000 
550,000 
74.5 
39.4 
29.0 
 
In the early 1980s, the government formulated a program for the 
development of household electrical appliance industries, including the 
manufacturing of refrigerators. First, from the late 1970s to the early 
1980s, the government formulated the “six priorities” policy to encourage 
and support development of consumer goods industries, particularly those 
specializing in the production of new types of consumer goods.7 This 
policy gave priority to energy, the supply of raw materials, the 
arrangement of capital construction projects, technical transformation 
projects, the use of foreign exchange needed for importing equipment and 
technology, imports needed to boost exports, and the arrangement of 
transportation.8 It also provided excellent conditions for the growth of the 
household electrical appliance industry.9 
 
 
 5. See Jiang Xiaojuan, Industrial Development and Industrial Policy in Economic Transition: A 
Case Study of the Household Electrical Appliance Industry, in CHINA’S INDUSTRIES IN TRANSITION: 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE, EFFICIENCY GAINS, AND GROWTH DYNAMICS, supra note 4, at 178. 
 6. Id. at 180. 
 7. Id. at 173.  
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
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Second, the government encouraged industries with excess supplies to 
either regroup or switch to other industries. In particular, the government 
urged enterprises in both heavy industry and the defense industry to switch 
to the consumer goods industry through a readjustment of capital stock. As 
a result, many enterprises producing investment-type machines, electrical 
products, and military supplies switched to the production of consumer-
type machines and electrical products by taking advantage of versatile 
equipment and technology in their industries.10 
Under the government’s industrial policies, many new enterprises 
entered the refrigerator industry while many old enterprises crossed over 
to the production of refrigerators. In 1985, China produced 1.4481 million 
refrigerators.11 The number of refrigerator-producing enterprises exceeded 
one hundred, and as Table 2 indicates, the top four producers (the 
Guangzhou Wanbao Electrical Appliance Industrial Company, the Beijing 
Refrigerator Plant, the Shanghai Refrigerator Plant, and the Suzhou 
Refrigerator Plant) had a combined output of 571,000 units and a 
production concentration rate of 39.4%.12 As a result, the nature of the 
Chinese refrigerator industry changed from being monopolistic to being 
competitive. 
In 1988, the output of refrigerators and washing machines in China 
reached its highest point of the decade. As Table 2 indicates, the total 
refrigerator output was 7.5763 million units and the four top 
manufacturers had a combined output of 2.197 million units, with a 
production concentration rate of 29.0%.13 
B. Industrial Policies Designed to Restrain Competition 
1. Background 
From the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, the government shifted the 
focus of its industrial policy from encouraging competition to restricting it. 
This shift came in response to the large numbers of small and medium-
sized non-state enterprises that emerged, grew in strength, and became 
even more competitive than state-owned enterprises. The market shares of 
state-owned enterprises shrank due to the increased competition from non-
state enterprises, and the profit-making capacity of state-owned enterprises 
 10. Id. at 173. 
 11. Id. at 178. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 179. 
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eventually decreased to the point that in some industries all state-owned 
enterprises were losing money. Under this pressure created by increased 
competition, the government, which maintained close ties with state-
owned enterprises, adjusted its industrial policies to limit the development 
of non-state enterprises in certain industries. This alleviated the effects of 
competition on state-owned enterprises. 
2. Industrial Policies and the Restriction of Competition 
a. Industrial Policies Designed to Restrain the Establishment of 
New Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises  
With the progress of reform, many small and medium-sized enterprises 
emerged and achieved robust growth, thereby exceeding the capacity of 
certain industries. The Chinese government labeled this problem as 
“indiscriminate construction.” Beginning in the mid-1980s, the 
government, under the pretext of containing “indiscriminate construction,” 
passed a number of industrial policies to restrict the development of small 
and medium-sized enterprises. In designing and implementing these 
policies, the government sought to prevent new investors from investing in 
industries operating above capacity. 
b. Industrial Policies Designed to Restrict Competition Between 
Rural and State-Owned Enterprises 
In the 1980s, some state-owned enterprises began to have severe 
management problems. In response, the Chinese government attempted to 
adopt new industrial organizational policies to readjust the relationship 
between state-owned enterprises and their non-state counterparts. These 
policies stipulated, among other things, that rural areas were not allowed 
to operate enterprises in fields where state-owned enterprises maintained 
an adequate production capacity. The government often instituted such 
policies for reasons other than simply according preferential treatment to 
the state-owned enterprises. One such reason for banning the 
establishment of new small and medium-sized rural enterprises in certain 
industries was to fully exploit the economies of scale of large state-owned 
enterprises. 
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c. Industrial Policies That Allow Only Designated Enterprises to 
Produce Certain Products 
In those industries that the government felt expanded industrial 
production capacities at speeds exceeding reasonable limits, the 
government quickly formulated policies to curtail new enterprises from 
entering. In the early 1980s, a major government policy designed for this 
purpose designated manufacturing enterprises for certain authorized 
production. For example, the Ministry of Light Industry designated only 
five factories (in Beijing, Guangzhou, Suzhou, Tianjin, and Shanghai) to 
be the authorized producers of refrigerators for all of China.14 
d. Preferential Industrial Policies for Large State-Owned 
Enterprises 
Beginning in the mid-1980s, some large state-owned enterprises 
experienced difficulty due to their failure to adapt to fledgling market 
competition. The government formulated preferential policies that allowed 
the state-owned enterprises to form enterprise groups while providing 
them with preferential investment and tax treatment. Under these policies, 
the government accorded large state-owned enterprises preferential 
treatment in the development of new products and technology while 
simultaneously banning non-state investors from entering industries 
dominated by these large state-owned enterprises. For example, the policy 
for the automotive industry, announced in 1993, prevented new enterprises 
from producing sedan cars, an area of production in which there were only 
three major manufacturers. 
Meriting attention is the fact that although the government promulgated 
many industrial policies to restrict competition during this period, the 
impact of the policies was considerably less than those policies enacted to 
encourage competition during the previous period. This is because the 
supportive industrial policies drew a warm response from enterprises, for 
they accorded with the interests of the enterprises, whereas restrictive 
industrial policies only courted opposition because they conflicted with the 
enterprises’ interests. However, the long-standing presence of these 
restrictive industrial policies delayed the shift of many Chinese 
manufacturing industries from being monopolistic to being competitive, 
thereby affecting their competitiveness as a whole. 
 14. Id. at 174. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol1/iss1/5
p 49 Xiaojuan book pages .doc  10/10/02   10:47 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] PROMOTING COMPETITION AND MAINTAINING MONOPOLY 61 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Case Study: How the Policy for the Refrigerator Industry Changed 
from Encouraging Competition to Curtailing It  
In the early 1980s, the support of the government industrial policy and 
the prospects for large profits whetted the desire of many new investors to 
enter the refrigerator industry, which originally consisted of only four 
companies. In only a few years’ time, more than one hundred companies 
were making refrigerators. In the meantime, some venerable state-owned 
refrigerator manufacturing companies were suffering from management 
difficulties and decreased economic efficiency. To cope with this situation, 
the government shifted its industrial policy from encouraging competition 
to curtailing it. 
At the end of 1984, the Ministry of Light Industry submitted an 
emergency report on this situation to the State Planning Commission and 
the State Economic Commission.15 In January 1985, these two 
commissions issued the Circular on Adopting Emergency Measures and 
Strictly Curbing the Arbitrary Import of Refrigerator Production Lines, 
and they entrusted the Ministry of Light Industry to convene a national 
conference on refrigerators. The purpose of this conference was to study 
methods for the readjustment and consolidation of China’s refrigerator 
factories.16 
In June 1985, the State Council approved the proposals of the State 
Planning Commission, the State Economic Commission, and the Ministry of 
Light Industry on Tightening Up the Management of the Refrigerator 
Industry and Controlling the Arbitrary Introduction of Foreign Technology 
and Equipment.17 This document raised a series of measures for limiting the 
growth of the refrigerator industry, including: reducing the number of 
refrigerator manufacturing factories from 116 to 41; 
(1) reducing the import production capacity from 13.5 million to 8.22 
million refrigerators; 
(2) preventing the establishment of new factories for approximately 
two years; 
(3) issuing production permits; 
 15. Id. at 174. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
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(4) strictly abiding by the system of examining and approving 
imported products through the coordination of the Ministry of 
Light Industry; 
(5) subjecting products that require more than US$5 million of 
investment to State Planning Commission approval as well as 
those needing less than US$5 million of investment to approval 
from the Ministry of Light Industry, in conjunction with the 
leading departments of the enterprise or locality concerned;18 
(6) requiring all refrigerator factories to pay taxes according to the tax 
law, and not allowing any departments or localities to grant tax 
reductions or exemptions; and 
(7) calling upon the Ministry of Light Industry to tighten its control 
over these industries.19 
This restrictive policy ultimately worked for only one or two years. 
With domestic demand snowballing and the refrigerator industry 
remaining lucrative, local governments and enterprises scrambled to build 
new refrigerator manufacturing firms by bypassing the restrictions of the 
central government’s industrial policy under various pretexts. Throughout 
1987 and 1988, refrigerator production in China reached an all-time high 
with the addition of an additional 180 refrigerator factories.20 As a result, 
China’s refrigerator production capacity increased to fifteen million 
units.21 
C. Industrial Policies That Promote and Restrict Competition 
1. Changes in China’s Economic Background 
Since the mid-1990s, the Chinese economy has undergone major 
changes. 
 18. It was only with the approval of these authorities that the Ministry of Foreign Economic 
Relations and Trade could issue import permits. The customs office banned unauthorized technology 
and equipment imports, and the bank did not grant loans in either Renminbi or foreign currency. 
 19. Jiang, supra note 5, at 174-75. 
 20. Id. at 175. 
 21. Id. 
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a. The Resolution of Product Shortages  
During the mid-1990s, most of the industries that experienced product 
shortages during the period of central planning manufactured more 
products than the market demanded. This overproduction left no reason to 
retain the supportive industrial policies that the government had designed 
to increase supply during the early years of reform. 
b. The Increased Role of the Market Mechanism 
After nearly two decades of reform, China has made remarkable 
progress in its economic restructuring, and the role of the market in 
regulating the relationship between supply and demand has increased 
dramatically. Under these circumstances, Chinese citizens expect the 
market to resolve temporary commodity shortages through its regulatory 
role rather than through the institution of new industrial policies. 
c. State-Owned Enterprises Experiencing Difficulty  
During the mid-1990s, state-owned enterprises in China found 
themselves with an unprecedented dilemma: approximately two-fifths of 
the large enterprises were losing money. Virtually all of the state-owned 
enterprises in the textile and coal mining industries were operating in the 
red. Believing that competition from non-state enterprises caused their 
difficulties, state-owned enterprises placed tremendous pressure on the 
government and demanded that the government improve their situation by 
strictly monitoring the development of non-state sectors. 
d. China’s Accession to the World Trade Organization 
With China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) now a 
reality, the break up of the monopolies held by large state-owned 
enterprises in some service industries (including the telecommunications 
and banking industries) is inevitable. Under these circumstances, many in 
China would like to break up monopolies to raise the efficiency and 
competitiveness of these industries by forming new industrial policies. 
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2. Industrial Policies Towards Monopolistic Industries: Encouraging 
Competition 
a. Why the Government Encourages Competition in Monopolistic 
Industries 
During the years of early reform, several state-owned enterprises 
monopolized certain Chinese industries,22 and in some cases, only a single 
enterprise existed. During the mid-1990s, pressure from three groups 
prompted the central government to deal with the issue of competition in 
these monopolistic industries. First, domestic consumers resented the poor 
quality and unreasonable fees of these industries and demanded 
improvements in the industries’ efficiency and services. Second, new 
investors wanting to enter these industries began to pressure the central 
government to address these industries’ long-standing monopolies and 
high profit levels. Third, with China’s recent accession to the WTO, China 
will have to give in to the long-standing external pressure to open its 
service markets. This pressure originally convinced both the central 
government and the monopolistic industries that they would be unable to 
compete with transnational companies from foreign countries once China 
entered into the WTO if they did not break up the monopolies and improve 
efficiency through competition. As a result, in the past five years, Chinese 
industries that several large state-owned enterprises formerly dominated 
have reoriented themselves to prepare for foreign competition. 
3. Industrial Policies That Discourage Competition: Rescuing State-
Owned Enterprises 
As the Chinese government believed that competition from many non-
state enterprises represented a major factor in the difficulties of state-
owned enterprises, one of the major steps it took to eliminate the 
difficulties of state-owned enterprises during the middle and late 1990s 
was to curtail the production capacity of certain industries. The 
government focused on closing down five types of small non-state 
enterprises: coal mines, steel rolling plants, cement factories, refineries, 
and glass-producing firms. The shutdowns in 1999 accounted for 10%-
15% of the production capacity in each of the respective industries. The 
government believed that the closure of these small enterprises would 
 22. These industries included the postal and telecommunications, railway transportation, civil 
aviation, banking, and insurance industries.  
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solve the problem of overproduction and alleviate the pressure of 
competition on the state-owned enterprises. Regardless of how the 
government deemed the nature of its industrial policies designed to rescue 
state-owned enterprises, it designed these policies to curtail competition. 
4. Reasonable Expectations  
From the late 1970s to the late 1980s, the Chinese people maintained 
unrealistic expectations about the government’s industrial policies to the 
extent that they hoped that these policies would cure every ailment present 
in Chinese industry. When there was a supply shortage of a certain 
product, people hoped that a supportive industrial policy would speed up 
production growth. Conversely, when the supply of a certain product 
exceeded demand, they pinned their hopes on a restrictive industrial policy 
to reduce production. When intensified competition was inflicting heavy 
financial losses on an increasing number of enterprises, Chinese citizens 
hoped that the industrial policies would reduce competition and improve 
enterprise management. When the lack of competition caused the 
efficiency of a certain industry to decrease, they hoped the government 
policies would promote competition. As a result of these expectations, the 
number of industrial policies announced during this period consistently 
increased. The state policies promulgated in 1989 to support, restrict, or 
ban industry development covered virtually all Chinese manufacturing 
industries. As a result, these policies defeated their own purpose of dealing 
with a finite number of industries in unusual situations. 
Since the mid-1990s, and even though these policies still play a 
specific role, people have realized that in a market economy the market 
mechanism can solve most of the problems that only industrial policies 
previously could solve. Thus, the government has decreased the creation 
of new industrial policies. The Chinese industrial policies widely carried 
out to support industries in short supply and restrict industries in 
overproduction have seen their domains dwindling steadily over the last 
few years. In contrast, antimonopolistic industrial policies are becoming 
inextricably intertwined with government policies. 
III. CONCLUSIONS AND OPINIONS 
A. Industrial Policies Are in a Major Position to Encourage Competition 
 
The analysis in this Article suggests that because the transformation of 
the Chinese legal system as a whole is trailing behind economic 
restructuring in the transition from central planning to a market economy, 
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the antimonopoly laws commensurate with the market economy have 
failed to tackle monopoly-related problems that the planned economy left 
behind. The role of encouraging competition marked a considerable 
number of industrial policies made during this period. It therefore is clear 
that industrial policies represent a major component of China’s policies on 
market competition. 
B. Competition-Associated Industrial Policies Are Experiencing a Decline 
Since the late-1990s, the overwhelming majority of Chinese 
manufacturing industries have become highly competitive, which caused 
government industrial policies to lose or reduce the role they previously 
played in promoting competition. Chinese industrial policies continue to 
promote competition in certain remaining monopolistic industries, but this 
role will continue to decline with the weakening or elimination of 
monopolies in these industries. 
C. China Calls for Standardized Policies to Promote Competition 
Although the role of Chinese industrial policies associated with 
competition is declining, this does not imply that the task of eliminating 
monopolies is complete. On the contrary, while the monopolies left by 
central planning are decreasing in number, the risk of monopoly inherent 
in the market economy is increasing. Meriting attention is the possibility 
that China’s accession to the WTO will encourage large transnational 
companies to form monopolies in the Chinese market and subsequently 
realize monopolistic profits. Because China cannot use industrial policies 
excessively after its accession to the WTO, it urgently needs to accelerate 
legislation and law enforcement to restrain monopoly and promote fair 
competition. This will enable its steps to normalize competitive behavior 
to continue to parallel the established practices of the market economy. 
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